

ONLINE APPENDIX


This online qualitative appendix expands on several facets of the main article.¹ The next section elaborates on process tracing methodology and case selection. The subsequent section assesses my argument in two additional cases of U.S.-sponsored regime change during the Cold War: (1) covert intervention in Guatemala in 1954 and (2) overt intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965.

Methodology

Process Tracing

In the article, I use process tracing to assess my argument in two prominent cases of foreign-imposed regime change. Broadly speaking, process tracing refers to “the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator.”² The development of a causal graph (reproduced below) aids in this process.

Figure 1. Causal Diagram of the Argument



As Waldner notes, causal graphs “represent ... *the set of causal relationships that constitute the process being traced by within-case evidence.*”³ Because my article explore how changes to the independent variable lead

¹ This exercise follows a recent and encouraging trend among scholars engaged in qualitative research of various kinds. See especially: Marcus Holmes and Keren Yarhi-Milo, “The Psychological Logic of Peace Summits: How Empathy Shapes Outcomes of Diplomatic Negotiations,” *International Studies Quarterly* 61, no. 1 (2017): 107–22; Paul Musgrave and Daniel H. Nexon, “Defending Hierarchy from the Moon to the Indian Ocean: Symbolic Capital and Political Dominance in Early Modern China and the Cold War,” *International Organization* (Forthcoming).

² David Collier, “Understanding Process Tracing,” *PS: Political Science & Politics* 44, no. 4 (2011): 823.

³ David Waldner, “What Makes Process Tracing Good? Causal Mechanisms, Causal Inference, and the Completeness Standard in Comparative Politics,” in *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool*, ed. Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 131, emphasis in original.

to changes to the dependent variable via the mechanisms outlined in Figure 1, I effectively perform two within-case analyses, one where legal exemptions were present and one where they were not.⁴

After substantiating the connections between the independent variables, the mechanisms, and the dependent variable using a mixture of declassified documents, interviews, and secondary sources, I assess a range of alternative explanations. Each of the alternative explanations posits a different independent variable and mechanism to explain the same outcome. That is, they are nonexclusive rivals,⁵ or what Sherry Zaks calls *coincident hypotheses*. In practice, leaders can be motivated to pursue covert action for multiple reasons. Showing that credibility and legitimacy concerns mattered in a given case does not prove that escalation or domestic politics were irrelevant, for example.

Methodologically speaking, coincident hypotheses “require different pieces of evidence both for corroboration and invalidation.”⁶ Identifying confirmatory evidence for one argument—in this case, my independent variable and causal mechanisms—neither invalidates nor confirms the alternatives. In each of the cases, then, I look at additional evidence to evaluate the veracity of rival arguments.⁷

Case Selection

To reiterate some of what’s in the main article, the universe of cases to which my argument applies are all regime change operations undertaken since 1945, both covert and overt, subject to the scope conditions I specified. My decision to focus on American interventions during the Cold War was motivated in large part by the fact that the U.S. in this time period satisfies the scope conditions, namely a state who cares about retaining its credibility and avoiding charges of hypocrisy.

There are additional benefits to focusing on the United States. For starters, it is among the most capable and important covert actors in world politics.⁸ Assessing whether my argument applies to episodes of U.S.-backed regime change is thus important in and of itself. Moreover, the widespread availability of primary documents, largely as a result of standard declassification procedures, congressional investigations, and the efforts of journalists makes it possible to carefully trace the causal mechanisms posited by my theory and to assess the validity of alternative explanations.⁹

⁴ This is similar to what George and Bennett called structured, focused comparison; see Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2005), Chapter 3.

⁵ See Ingo Rohlfing, “Comparative Hypothesis Testing Via Process Tracing,” *Sociological Methods and Research* 43, no. 4 (2014): 606–42.

⁶ Sherry Zaks, “Relationships Among Rivals (RAR): A Framework for Analyzing Contending Hypotheses in Process Tracing,” *Political Analysis* 25, no. 3 (2017): 351.

⁷ There have been significant advances in process tracing with regard to the use of Bayesian methods; see Tasha Fairfield and Andrew E. Charman, “Explicit Bayesian Analysis for Process Tracing: Guidelines, Opportunities, and Caveats,” *Political Analysis* 25, no. 3 (2017): 363–80; Macartan Humphreys and Alan M. Jacobs, “Mixing Methods: A Bayesian Approach,” *American Political Science Review* 109, no. 4 (2015): 653–73. As Zaks has pointed out, however, such approaches are easiest when the rival explanations under consideration are mutually exclusive and is much harder in cases where hypotheses are coincident; see Zaks, “Relationships Among Rivals (RAR): A Framework for Analyzing Contending Hypotheses in Process Tracing,” 353–55.

⁸ Michael F. Joseph and Michael Poznansky, “Media Technology, Covert Action, and the Politics of Exposure,” *Journal of Peace Research* (Forthcoming): 2.

⁹ Lindsey O’Rourke, *Covert Regime Change: America’s Secret Cold War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018).

My decision to focus on Cuba and Grenada was driven by several considerations. First, they hold constant relevant factors that might otherwise bear on the decision to pursue regime change (c)overly: the geographic location of the intervention (the Caribbean), the ideological-bent of the targeted regime (communist), the level of hostility between the U.S. and the Soviet Union which was high in the early 1960s and 1980s, and the party of the president who initiated the action (Republican).¹⁰

Focusing on Cuba and Grenada has additional benefits beyond what's mentioned in the body of the article. To begin, given the way much of the literature talks about the Western hemisphere—and the Caribbean in particular—the Bay of Pigs constitutes a least-likely case for the constraining role of international law on U.S. decision-makers' behavior. Many scholars view this region as squarely within the U.S. sphere-of-influence where decision-makers could act as they pleased.¹¹ Moreover, Cuba was a *de facto* dictatorship at the time of intervention. Of the few scholarly studies which focus on covert action, many see democracy as a key factor motivating leaders to reach for the quiet option. Demonstrating that the absence of a legal exemption to nonintervention drove leaders to pursue covert action despite the location and character of the regime is thus powerful evidence.¹²

Grenada also presents a least-likely case for my legal theory of covert action in some respects. Grenada was a weak country, also in America's backyard. The prospect of Reagan, a hawk known for hardline views of the Soviet Union, privileging international legal justifications over alternatives like anti-communism or the desire to send a signal to the Cubans or the Soviets would be telling.

Case Extensions

As an external validity check, I explore two additional cases of U.S.-backed regime change during the Cold War: (1) Eisenhower's covert intervention in Guatemala in 1954 and (2) Johnson's overt invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965.¹³ Assessing my argument in these two intervention episodes is valuable for a couple reasons. First, one alternative explanation for the Bay of Pigs episode is that decision-makers were attracted to covert action given prior successes in Guatemala (and Iran). Showing that my theory explains this case is thus informative. Second, although the Grenada invasion serves as a useful comparison to the Bay of Pigs for reasons outlined above, showing that Johnson was motivated by similar concerns in 1965 as Reagan was in 1983 enhances generalizability.

Before proceeding, one caveat is in order. These case studies are not meant to serve as comprehensive tests of my theory against a broad set of alternative explanations. Rather, they are simply meant to illustrate that the legal theory of covert action developed in the article applies broadly.

¹⁰ Although John F. Kennedy, a Democrat, is most often associated with the Bay of Pigs since it was carried out on his watch, it was actually Dwight Eisenhower, a Republican, who first authorized the covert operation.

¹¹ G. John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 27; Peter J. Katzenstein, *A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 226.

¹² Alexander B. Downes and Mary Lauren Lilley, "Overt Peace, Covert War?: Covert Intervention and the Democratic Peace," *Security Studies* 19, no. 2 (2010): 266–306; David P. Forsythe, "Democracy, War, and Covert Action," *Journal of Peace Research* 29, no. 4 (1992): 385–95; O'Rourke, *Covert Regime Change: America's Secret Cold War*.

¹³ The Dominican Republic is a hard case for demonstrating the role of international law as a factor in decision-making given the prevailing obsession with preventing a "second Cuba" after the Bay of Pigs. To the extent that Johnson appealed to legal exemptions rather than blatant national security appeals, my argument will be strengthened.

Guatemala, 1954—PBSUCCESS

Dwight D. Eisenhower's covert intervention in Guatemala in 1954 followed on the heels of another successful covert intervention the previous year in Iran. The drama leading up to the decision to pursue regime change quietly against Jacobo Arbenz unfolded over a few years. Here, I will review these details briefly. In what follows, it should be evident that the same factors pushing Eisenhower, and later Kennedy, underground in Cuba in 1960-1961 were relevant in this case, too.

Historical background

Guatemala gained independence from the Spanish Empire in 1821. In the century leading up to U.S. intervention in 1954, the country was governed by *caudillos*, or strong men.¹⁴ Economic inequality ruled the day. The wealthy elites used the impoverished Maya Indians as cheap labor. According to Richard Immerman, "Prior to Arbenz's land reform in 1952, only 2.2 percent of Guatemala's population held over 70 percent of the land, and less than one-sixth of 1 percent held almost 14 percent."¹⁵ Some of the large landowners included American corporations like the United Fruit Company.¹⁶

In 1931, Jorge Ubico Casteñada assumed power. Ubico, a staunch anti-communist and strongman, terrorized Guatemalan society.¹⁷ Small-scale protests, which broke out thirteen years later in the spring and summer of 1944, turned into open revolt among the populace.¹⁸ In June, Ubico stepped down, turning power over to three generals under the leadership of General Federico Ponce.¹⁹ By October, the generals were ousted. On December 19, 1944, Juan José Arévalo was elected in free and fair elections.²⁰ Over the course of the next six years, Arévalo cut ties with dictatorial regimes, carried out agrarian reform, and overhauled the educational and social life of much of the country.²¹

Elected in November 1950, Jacobo Arbenz accelerated many of his predecessor's reformist policies.²² A chief priority was to continue overhauling Guatemala's economic system which included massive land redistribution.²³ Among those most heavily impacted were large corporations like United Fruit.²⁴

¹⁴ Richard H. Immerman, *The CIA In Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1982), 22; Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, 1999), 28–29.

¹⁵ Immerman, *The CIA In Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*, 28.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 68–75. For more on the United Fruit Company, see Piero Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 88–98.

¹⁷ Nick Cullather, *Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 9–10; Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954*, 11–23; Immerman, *The CIA In Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*, 32–37.

¹⁸ Cullather, *Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954*, 11–12; Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954*, 23–25; Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*, 25–28.

¹⁹ Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*, 28.

²⁰ Immerman, *The CIA In Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*, 45.

²¹ Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954*, 41–49; Immerman, *The CIA In Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*, 48–57; Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*, 37–42.

²² Cullather, *Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954*, 22–24; Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*, 49–63.

²³ Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954*, 145–47, 150–58; Immerman, *The CIA In Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*, 64–67.

²⁴ Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*, 75–77.

By the start of 1954, plans were underway inside the U.S. to overthrow Arbenz.²⁵ The operation was codenamed PBSUCCESS.²⁶ Castillo Armas was designated as Arbenz's "replacement."²⁷

The plan involved creating the false impression that Armas, who had limited resources, was mounting a full-scale assault.²⁸ As Immerman points out, "If the Guatemalans thought that the Army of Liberation was invincible, if they thought that the bombers and tanks poised in Nicaragua and Honduras were prepared to support the invasion should the regular army offer resistance, they would abandon Arbenz and force his resignation."²⁹ Toward this end, the CIA used propaganda to persuade the populace that a large-scale invasion against the government was underway and carried out real and contrived air raids to simulate a massive bombing campaign.³⁰ Arbenz resigned on June 27.³¹ After several days of tense negotiations between various military officers, Armas assumed power.³²

Why did Eisenhower intervene covertly?

The standard story of why Eisenhower covertly overthrew Jacobo Arbenz turns on the United States' perennial fear of communism during this time period. Arbenz himself was not a communist, but U.S. decision-makers feared that his government might be co-opted by them.³³ Rather than waiting to see if this would indeed happen, so the argument goes, Eisenhower pursued regime change.³⁴

²⁵ The covert operation against Arbenz was given the green light in August 1953; see Cullather, *Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954*, 38–40; Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954*, 243; Mark T. Hove, "The Arbenz Factor: Salvador Allende, U.S.-Chilean Relations, and the 1954 U.S. Intervention in Guatemala," *Diplomatic History* 31, no. 4 (2007): 630; Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*, 108.

²⁶ See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Guatemala, ed. Susan Holly (United States Government Printing Office Washington, 2003), Document 52 (<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54Guat/d52>) and Immerman, *The CIA In Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*, 138.

²⁷ Cullather, *Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954*, 49–52; Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954*, 249–52; Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*, 122.

²⁸ For an overview of the operation as it developed, see Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Guatemala, ed. Susan Holly (United States Government Printing Office Washington, 2003), Document 274 (<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54Guat/d274>) and Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*, 99–117.

²⁹ Immerman, *The CIA In Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*, 163.

³⁰ Some of the planes, for example, dropped smoke bombs to simulate a real explosion but which caused no real damage; see Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954*, 309–10; Immerman, *The CIA In Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*, 166–67; Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*, 16–17, 182–83, 192–93.

³¹ Cullather, *Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954*, 101; Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954*, 347; Immerman, *The CIA In Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*, 174; Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*, 199–201.

³² Cullather, *Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954*, 103–4; Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954*, 351–57; Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*, 205–14.

³³ Forsythe, "Democracy, War, and Covert Action," 387.

³⁴ A National Intelligence Estimate from May 11, 1952 emphasizes the growing threat of communism in Guatemala. See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Guatemala, ed. Susan Holly (United States Government Printing Office Washington, 2003), Document 6 (<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54Guat/d6>).

Whether the United States exaggerated the threat of communism in Guatemala in the late-1940s and early 1950s is beyond the scope of what I am after.³⁵ Most relevant is the fact that ideological competition, while offering a rationale for *why* the U.S. intervened,³⁶ is a poor predictor of explaining *how* the administration chose to intervene, namely via covert action. As we saw in the main article—and as I explain in the second case study below—fear of communism was present across cases of both overt and covert regime change. Some other factor is needed to explain this decision.

My argument is that the absence of a legal exemption to the nonintervention principle drove Eisenhower to pursue regime change against Arbenz covertly. Evidence from the secondary literature confirms that the Eisenhower administration, and the Truman administration before it, were keen on maintaining America's image as a "good neighbor" and respecting nonintervention during this period.³⁷ In this vein, Piero Gleijeses writes that, "President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles wanted to protect the image of the United States abroad, particularly in Latin America" realizing that the U.S. "must 'avoid the appearance of unilateral action' in the internal affairs of the Latin American republics." Gleijeses continues, "[t]hus, there was 'a paradox at the heart of PBSUCCESS,' a paradox that was resolved by a fig leaf. 'The fig leaf was designed to deny U.S. involvement....'"³⁸

Declassified documents from the years preceding the 1954 reveal that concerns about brazenly violating nonintervention without a legal exemption was a key driver of secrecy. Discussions from just a few months into Arbenz's presidency contain clues about how senior U.S. officials were thinking about the dilemma they were facing. Although decision-makers clearly recognized that something had to be done to counter the increasing influence of communism in Guatemala, concerns about optics were front and center. A paper prepared for the undersecretary's meeting, dated June 12, 1950, read:

"Nothing would harm overall interests of the United States in Guatemala more than the premature employment of overly aggressive [sic] measures with respect to Guatemalan internal matters. The communists would be furnished with a valuable weapon throughout Latin America and would be able to do great harm to the inter-American system through a revival of mistrust in the United States and fears of a return to the days of unilateral intervention and 'big-stick' diplomacy."³⁹

³⁵ Immerman, *The CIA In Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*, 101. For a description of a high-profile incident—the transfer of arms from Czechoslovakia—that gave the administration fodder for declaring Arbenz's regime as dominated by communists, see Cullather, *Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954*, 77–82; Hove, "The Arbenz Factor: Salvador Allende, U.S.-Chilean Relations, and the 1954 U.S. Intervention in Guatemala," 635–36; Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*, 147–57.

³⁶ John M. Owen, *The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, States, and Regime Change, 1510-2010* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

³⁷ On Truman, see Immerman, *The CIA In Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*, 11. On Eisenhower administration officials walking the fine line between expressing anti-communist sentiments while attempting to respect nonintervention, see Cullather, *Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954*, 57–59; Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*, 142–45.

³⁸ Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954*, 247.

³⁹ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Volume II, eds. Ralph R. Goodwin, N. Stephen Kane, and Harriet D. Schwar (United States Government Printing Office Washington, 1979), Document 801 (<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951v02/d801>). The undersecretary's meeting is described by the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series as follows: "The Under Secretary's meeting convened weekly; it was customarily attended by the Deputy Under Secretaries of State, Assistant Secretaries of State, and certain office directors. Under Secretary of State James E. Webb presided at these meetings."

Three days later on June 15, 1951 Thomas Mann—the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs at the time and a key player in both the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Dominican Republic intervention—echoed similar sentiments:

“He emphasized that we should proceed quietly since this proposed policy [of applying economic pressures] is, in effect, a violation of the Non-intervention Agreement to which we are a party. He pointed out that this policy has a risk involved, because the Non-intervention Agreement is a corner-stone of our Latin-American foreign policy. If it became obvious that we were violating this agreement, other Latin American governments would rally to the support of Guatemala. This would strengthen the hands of the nationalists and communists in that country. He pointed out that these proposed actions would be the first of its kind since the establishment of the Good Neighbor policy. He emphasized again that these steps should be handled quietly, and that each one should be justified on technical grounds.”⁴⁰

It is clear from this statement that Mann, in addition to worrying about stoking nationalism,⁴¹ was concerned about taking overtly hostile actions against Guatemala in violation of the nonintervention principle for fear of damaging America’s image in the hemisphere. As we will see below, Mann harbored no such reservations during the Dominican Republic invasion, presumably as a result of the legal exemptions that were available to the Johnson administration prior to taking military action.⁴²

On October 3, 1952, Mann penned a memo to Secretary of State Dean Acheson with the subject “Possible Military Action Against Guatemala.” In the memo, Mann examined the risks of lending U.S. support to the President of Nicaragua’s plan to topple Arbenz.⁴³ Mann noted that he and one of his colleagues had told the Nicaraguan Ambassador “that the United States could never condone military intervention on the part of an American State against one of its neighbors, pointing out that non-intervention was one of the very keystones of the Inter-American system and that there are treaty commitments against such action.”⁴⁴ Again, Mann’s lack of concern about nonintervention in the Dominican Republic suggests that the absence of legal exemptions was foremost on his mind here.

A top secret “Draft Policy Paper Prepared in the Bureau of the Inter-American Affairs” dated August 19, 1953—around the same time the Eisenhower administration approved PBSUCCESS—contains similar themes to those Mann had articulated. After outlining the growing communist threat in Guatemala, the draft policy paper emphasized that on the political front, the U.S. should “[conserve] the underlying good will built up in Guatemala (as elsewhere) by our policies of non-intervention, respect for juridical equality and abnegation of a position of privilege.” In an annex to the memo

⁴⁰ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Volume II, eds. Ralph R. Goodwin, N. Stephen Kane, and Harriet D. Schwar (United States Government Printing Office Washington, 1979), Document 802 (<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951v02/d802>).

⁴¹ Julian Go, *Patterns of Empire: The British and American Empires, 1688 to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 137–45, 151–58.

⁴² For more on Mann’s early recognition of the need for action in Guatemala, see Immerman, *The CIA In Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*, 118–19; Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*, 92.

⁴³ For a discussion of this plan which was codenamed PBFORTUNE, see Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*, 102.

⁴⁴ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The American Republics, Volume IV, eds. N. Stephen Kane and William F. Sanford, Jr. (United States Government Printing Office Washington, 1983), Document 413 (<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d413>).

which outlined policy options, the option of direct intervention was described as being simultaneously easy since Guatemala was militarily inferior to the U.S. but also politically risky:

“[T]he use of direct military or economic sanctions on Guatemala would violate solemn United States commitments and under present circumstances would endanger the entire fund of good will the United States has built up in the other American Republics through its policies of non-intervention, respect for juridical equality, and abnegation of a position of privilege. Loss of this good will would be a disaster to the United States far outweighing the advantage of any success gained in Guatemala.”⁴⁵

As should be clear from this brief discussion, concerns about brazenly violating nonintervention given the damage it would do to America’s image and credibility were evident throughout this episode.

The Dominican Republic, 1965—Operation Power Pack

Lyndon B. Johnson’s intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 marked the first time the United States openly deployed force in Latin America in over thirty years to that point. As with the Guatemala case, the events surrounding Johnson’s decision to intervene overtly are complicated and I will only deal with them only briefly. Nevertheless, the conditions that enabled Reagan to intervene openly in Grenada in 1983 closely mirror those which were present in this case.

Historical background

The Dominican Republic gained independence in 1844. For decades afterward, the country was plagued with crises and instability. Between 1844 and 1855, Haiti constituted the biggest military threat.⁴⁶ At the turn of the twentieth century, Theodore Roosevelt intervened with the stated purpose of occupying the custom houses and assuming responsibility for much of the country’s finances.⁴⁷ The next episode of U.S. intervention came in 1916 when Woodrow Wilson landed marines in the country to quell an ongoing civil war. U.S. forces stayed for the next eight years, departing in 1924.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The American Republics, Volume IV, eds. N. Stephen Kane and William F. Sanford, Jr. (United States Government Printing Office Washington, 1983), Document 424 (<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d424>). The memo also notes that covert intervention could be equally risky given the high risks of exposure, a position similar to the one Mann articulated in the Bay of Pigs. For a similar set of concerns exhibited by other officials in the State Department, see Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Guatemala, ed. Susan Holly (United States Government Printing Office Washington, 2003), Document 115 (<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54Guat/d115>). One of the senior officials involved in the planning, Frank G. Wisner, noted that the U.S. would likely be blamed for Arbenz’s overthrow regardless of whether it was involved but that the charges would lack “irrefutable evidence”; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Guatemala, ed. Susan Holly (United States Government Printing Office Washington, 2003), Document 33 (<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54Guat/d133>).

⁴⁶ Piero Gleijeses, *The Dominican Crisis: The 1965 Constitutionalist Revolt and American Intervention* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 8–13.

⁴⁷ David A. Lake, *Hierarchy in International Relations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 4.

⁴⁸ Abraham F. Lowenthal, *The Dominican Intervention* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 9.

From 1930 until 1961, the Dominican Republic was ruled by a ruthless dictator named Rafael Trujillo.⁴⁹ For decades, Trujillo enjoyed close relations with the United States. This began to change in the late-1950s when, following Castro's revolution in Cuba, U.S. decision-makers began to reassess the policy of unqualified support for right-wing dictators.⁵⁰ In 1960, the U.S. helped impose sanctions in conjunction with the Organization of American States (OAS).⁵¹ In May 1961, Trujillo was assassinated, allegedly with covert support from the Kennedy administration.⁵²

The next four years were marked by more instability and change. After Trujillo's downfall, Joaquín Balaguer took over as head of state. He was ousted in January of 1962 and replaced by a Council of State until elections were held later that calendar year.⁵³ In 1963, Juan Bosch, the winner of the election, was inaugurated. He represented the country's first popularly elected leader in over three decades.⁵⁴ Bosch's tenure as president was short-lived. In September of that same year, he was overthrown in a military coup. Donald Reid Cabral emerged as the new leader.⁵⁵ On April 24, 1965, Reid's government was toppled in a "counter-coup" by elements loyal to Bosch, pitting the "constitutionalists" against the so-called "loyalists."⁵⁶ These events set the stage for U.S. military intervention days later.

On April 28, 1965, President Johnson made the decision to deploy a limited number of Marines, roughly 400 of them, to the Dominican Republic with the ostensible purpose of rescuing American and other foreign nationals threatened by the incipient violence. Soon after, "Johnson approved the landing of thousands more Marines, who began to arrive overnight on April 29-30. Within ten days, there would be almost 23,000 American troops in the Dominican Republic."⁵⁷

Why did Johnson intervene overtly?

The conventional narrative in the literature regarding Johnson's decision to openly deploy forces to the United States goes like this. After the disastrous Bay of Pigs operation, the U.S. was obsessed with the possibility of a "second Cuba." Once it became evident that the loyalists might lose to the constitutionalists, effectively meaning the return of Bosch and the prospect of a communist takeover, Johnson deployed forces in complete disregard of international law and norms.⁵⁸

⁴⁹ On Trujillo's rise to power, see Gleijeses, *The Dominican Crisis: The 1965 Constitutionalist Revolt and American Intervention*, 20–29; Jonathan Hartlyn, *The Struggle for Democratic Politics in the Dominican Republic* (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 39–42.

⁵⁰ Russell Crandall, *Gunboat Democracy: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006), 47.

⁵¹ Jerome Slater, *Intervention and Negotiation: The United States and the Dominican Revolution* (New York, Evanston, and London: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1970), 8.

⁵² Crandall, *Gunboat Democracy: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama*, 48–49.

⁵³ Gleijeses, *The Dominican Crisis: The 1965 Constitutionalist Revolt and American Intervention*, 30–64; Lowenthal, *The Dominican Intervention*, 12.

⁵⁴ Stephen G Rabe, "The Johnson Doctrine," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 1 (2006): 55.

⁵⁵ Gleijeses, *The Dominican Crisis: The 1965 Constitutionalist Revolt and American Intervention*, 115–16.

⁵⁶ Elizabeth N. Saunders, *Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), 156.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 159.

⁵⁸ For examples of works that use some version of this narrative, see Gleijeses, *The Dominican Crisis: The 1965 Constitutionalist Revolt and American Intervention*; Lowenthal, *The Dominican Intervention*; Rabe, "The Johnson Doctrine"; Slater, *Intervention and Negotiation: The United States and the Dominican Revolution*.

This account is incomplete at best. It is undoubtedly true that fears of a second Cuba and the threat of a communist takeover—whether valid or not⁵⁹—motivated the Johnson administration to intervene. The fear of communism alone, however, cannot explain why Dwight Eisenhower chose to act covertly in Guatemala in 1954 or in Cuba in 1960 to address a similar threat. The same is true of covert interventions in Chile (1973) or Nicaragua (1980s), both of which targeted leftist regimes.⁶⁰

My argument is that the presence of various legal exemptions to the nonintervention principle enabled the Johnson administration to do what Reagan would later do in Grenada: intervene openly. The first and most prominent justification offered for the use of force was the need to protect and evacuate American citizens and other foreign nationals threatened by the outbreak of civil war. On April 28, Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett sent a high-importance “CRITIC” telegram to Washington:

Regret report situation deteriorating rapidly...

Benoit of junta sent formal request U.S. supply troops, told MAAG Chief that without help they would ‘have to quit.’ In view this report and recent messages through [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], Country Team unanimously of opinion that, now that we have request from military junta for assistance, 2 time has come to land the Marines.

American lives are in danger. We suggest, subject conditions at moment, Marines establish beach head in Hotel Embajador vicinity centering on polo field which can be used by helicopters for landing. We would also be glad have detachment take possession Embassy grounds. If Washington wishes, they can be landed for purpose protect evacuation American citizens. We have just been told by police chief, for instance, that he cannot provide protection route Haina Naval Base which has been used until now for evacuations.

I recommend immediate landing.⁶¹

While Johnson’s memoirs indicate that he took this threat seriously,⁶² the presence of Americans plausibly in harm’s way offered the administration a way to justify its initial decision to deploy forces in the midst of an ongoing civil war. The military officer in charge of U.S. forces, Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer, was told by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Early Wheeler: “Your announced mission is to save US lives. Your unannounced mission is to prevent the Dominican Republic from going Communist. The President has stated that he will not allow another Cuba—you are to take all necessary measures to accomplish this mission. You will be given sufficient forces to do the job.”⁶³

⁵⁹ On this question, see Crandall, *Gunboat Democracy: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama*, 37; Gleijeses, *The Dominican Crisis: The 1965 Constitutionalist Revolt and American Intervention*, 290–94; Rabe, “The Johnson Doctrine,” 54–55; Slater, *Intervention and Negotiation: The United States and the Dominican Revolution*, 26.

⁶⁰ Forsythe, “Democracy, War, and Covert Action.”

⁶¹ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana, eds. Daniel J. Lawler and Carolyn Yee (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2005), Document 32 (<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v32/d32>).

⁶² Lyndon B. Johnson, *The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963–1969* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 195.

⁶³ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana, eds. Daniel J. Lawler and Carolyn Yee (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2005), Document 43 (<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v32/d43>).

Many scholars have pointed to the administration's rhetorical shift on April 30, which expanded the justification for intervention beyond protecting Americans to combatting communism, as evidence of Johnson dispensing with the evacuation and pretext and showing his true colors.⁶⁴

Special Assistant to the President Jack Valenti's meeting notes of a high-level gathering in the White House Cabinet Room on the morning of the thirtieth, however, suggest that a key rationale for emphasizing communism actually had to do with winning OAS support. In this meeting, Johnson and his top advisers discussed next steps and how to proceed, including what moves might be necessary to justify the continued presence of American forces on the island. Secretary of State Dean Rusk told Johnson that, "We can move through the OAS and achieve what you want...." In response, Johnson asked Secretary of Defense McNamara "Why don't you first find out what we need to take that island" and asked Rusk "why don't you determine what it takes to make this take on the right color." National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy worried that "We have no international cover. We have no real legitimacy." After continued discussion, Undersecretary of State George Ball pointed out that, "...we have put men ashore without real angry response." The discussion that ensued is informative:

LBJ: I want McNamara to get ready so that Castro cannot take over.

McNamara: Before we move, open press corps—show evidence of Castro takeover—evidence irrefutable. Until we act, Castro will be in command of the island—China Reds. Call on Latin American countries to join US in support to crush Communist threat. Call on Dominican Republic citizens to organize their own government. Must have some government to get behind. Asked US to come in to save their island from communism.

LBJ: *I want US to feverishly try to cloak this with legitimacy. We cannot stand with our hand in our pocket and let Castro win. Military get ducks in a row. Diplomats see if we can do anything to get observers in here or troops from other Latin American countries. We are willing to do whatever is necessary to put the pistols down. We will have one of 3 dictators: 1) U.S., 2) Moderate dictator, 3) Castro dictator.*

Bundy: Here are some thoughts that may or may not be helpful to you. One thing is clear: a Castro victory in the D.R. would [be] the worst domestic political disaster we could possibly suffer. *But in order to quash Castro in D.R. we need above all else to get hemispheric public opinion on our side. We can do it this way: Before we move call an open press conference. 1. Show indisputable evidence that Castro-Communists are in control in the D.R. (CIA ought to prepare full dossiers) Vital that this [be] proven without a doubt. If can be linked to Chinese reds all the better. 2. Call on D.R. citizens to rise up (if at all possible, a group of responsible D.R. Citizens should cry out for US to save them from Castro). 3. Call on Latin-American countries to join with us—(if we can announce 2-3 or 4 countries who are with US all the better). 4. Give[n] the choice: stand by [and] do nothing, let Castro take over or with the OAS and local entreaties move in to quell the Castro people and save this island from black darkness. We must lay the public opinion base—a clear choice: freedom versus Castro; citizens cry out for help versus Castro reds.*⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Gleijeses, *The Dominican Crisis: The 1965 Constitutionalist Revolt and American Intervention*, 258.

⁶⁵ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana, eds. Daniel J. Lawler and Carolyn Yee (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2005), Document 42 (<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v32/d42>); emphasis mine.

That same morning, Johnson was able to declare publicly that U.S. forces were helping to enforce an OAS-sanctioned cease-fire and fortify an international security zone.⁶⁶ Several days later on May 6, the OAS voted “to create the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) to serve as peacekeepers in Santo Domingo....”⁶⁷ Although the resolution passed by just fourteen votes—the bare minimum required—the creation of the IAPF lent legitimacy to the continued presence of American forces.⁶⁸

The similarities to the Grenada invasion explored in the main article are striking. There are, of course, some differences. Chief among these is the fact that the administration received the OAS blessing *after* the deployment of forces whereas the OECS had blessed the Grenada invasion beforehand. This, then, raises an interesting counterfactual. What would Johnson have done had the OAS refused to sanction the invasion by creating the IAPF on May 6? Would he have kept U.S. forces there, and possibly increased them to the numbers he eventually did, in defiance of their wishes?

Like all counterfactuals, this is unknowable. Nevertheless, there is reason to believe he might not have. As scholars have pointed out, Johnson showed disdain for the OAS in private.⁶⁹ The fact that he consulted them at all is testament to the importance his administration accorded to their stamp of approval. It is thus plausible that he may have viewed the political costs of seeking their approval, failing to secure it, and staying anyway as significant enough to alter his decision-making calculus.

One final piece of evidence lends credence to my claim that the administration viewed the presence of Americans in danger, and later the OAS’s blessing, as significant for justifying the presence of U.S. soldiers: Thomas Mann’s support for the invasion. Readers will recall from the main article that Mann was a sharp critic of the Bay of Pigs operation at various points owing to the prospect that the U.S. would get caught, thereby undermining America’s image and credibility in light of prior commitments to the nonintervention principle. The same was true in the discussions surrounding how to approach Arbenz in Guatemala. Mann’s support for Operation Power Pack suggests that he viewed the administration’s justifications as sufficient to openly violate nonintervention. In fact, Mann was instrumental during the early stages of the operation in keeping the narrative focused on protecting Americans,⁷⁰ presumably as a way of ensuring that the justification was deemed legitimate.

⁶⁶ Lowenthal, *The Dominican Intervention*, 114–15.

⁶⁷ Crandall, *Gunboat Democracy: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama*, 78.

⁶⁸ Hartlyn, *The Struggle for Democratic Politics in the Dominican Republic*, 89.

⁶⁹ H.W. Brands, “Decisions on American Armed Intervention: Lebanon, Dominican Republic, and Grenada,” *Political Science Quarterly* 102, no. 4 (1987): 614; Saunders, *Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions*, 159.

⁷⁰ Daniel I. Papermaster, “A Case Study of the Effect of International Law on Foreign Policy Decisionmaking: The United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965,” *Texas International Law Journal* 24, no. 3 (1989): 472.